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Introduction
The formal relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Turkey were established in 1971, following China’s admission to the UN. During the first decade of bilateral relations, economic cooperation and political relations were rather weak. One can argue that this stemmed from the geographical distance between the two, however, the main reason was and still is, the difference in the foreign policy approaches that they adopted and their perception of each other as a ‘threat’. On the one hand, China's foreign policy with geographically distant countries during that time was ‘passive pragmatism’. According to this approach, the main objective was to meet the energy and market needs of the country by avoiding political risks in foreign policy. On the other hand, Turkey's approach can be described as ‘First West’, which prioritizes its relations with the West and considers it as a reference point in foreign policy matters. That is the reason why only after the September 12 military coup in Turkey that was followed by the deterioration of relations with the European Economic Community, the Sino-Turkish relationship gained momentum (Temiz, 2017). In other words, weak bilateral relations until the 1980s were the result of different policy approaches rather than geographic distance.
This difference becomes more palpable as the standpoint of the two during the Arab Spring and Syrian crises is analyzed in light of Turkey's NATO membership and its efforts for EU accession. Another factor to be considered while analyzing the Sino-Turkish relations is China’s close ties with Russia, which gains even more importance in the post-Soviet territory, where these three are striving to maximize their influence. Also, the economic crises in Turkey and the Turkish lira’s recent devaluation are necessary factors to analyze further economic cooperation. In this sense, whether Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a method to seize the strategic infrastructure from the recipient countries will be analyzed, using the most cited examples of Hambantota Airport in Sri Lanka and the Malaysian case.
This paper will draw on the approaches of the Copenhagen School in explaining bilateral relations. Turkish sources have generally examined Sino-Turkish relations through the vulnerabilities in domestic politics, that is to say, with regards to the issues on ethnic minorities living in respective countries. This approach negatively affects not only the existing relations but also causes a lack of strategic vision for the future, while strengthening the antagonism between the two. However, China, as a global power, should be an important partner for Turkey. This paper aims to provide a throughout analysis of the bilateral relations focusing on the two as global and regional powers. Therefore, the dependent variable is Sino-Turkish relations, whereas the independent variable will be Turkey’s NATO membership and China’s relation with Russia.
Materials and methods
Historical Development of the Bilateral Relationships.
In 1963, the Ankara Agreement, which forms the legal basis of Turkey's relations with the European Union entered into force. But the origins of 'westernization' can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire and regarded as ‘Ottoman legacy’, for some, a ‘civilization project’. That is to say, in the international arena, Turkey formulates its policies accordingly with the demands of the ‘West’.
For instance, during the Korean War, the UN and the US sided with South Korea, whereas China and the Soviet Union supported the North. Turkey supported the former and sent its troops to the war in 1950. This was positively assessed by the United States and in 1952 Turkey obtained its long-awaited NATO membership. In this context, the 'red threat' has become the number one threat to national security in Turkey, and the Korean War shaped its perception of communist China and other socialist countries (Demircan, 2020). On the other hand, while Turkey generally had an anti-communist stance, the Chinese Government, especially during the 1960s, has also clearly expressed its support for the development of the anti-American movement in Turkey (Tao, 2016). Thus, even before the formal relationship started in 1971, following China’s admission to the UN, their perception of each other was not favorable, and not until the 1980s did the bilateral relations were consolidated.
As the result of the military coup in September 1980 damaged the image Turkey had in the Western world and the European Economic Community, therefore the search for an alternative partner paves the way for the consolidation of relations with China. Coming to the 1990s, China’s ever-rising demand for energy sources and its shift from “passive” to “active pragmatism” raised the importance of the Middle East region and its security for China. That is to say, China became an important stakeholder in the region and an even more important partner for Turkey.
However, Ankara’s policies regarding the Central Asian countries that became independent following the collapse of the USSR and Turkey granting political asylum to Muhammed Niyazi, the Commercial Attache of the Chinese Embassy because he lacks life security, are important factors leading to the period of no high-level visits between 1991-2000. Yet China still needed Turkey’s support because of the common cultural and historical ground it shared with the newly independent countries to effectively implement its Eurasian policies. However, the fact that China and Turkey have no common definition of terrorism is continuing to make it more difficult for the two to cooperate. Within this framework, China is abstaining from Turkey’s full integration into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well.
The Arab Spring and Syria Crisis Period
Since the 1990s, China is no longer only in search of energy resources and markets, it has now become an active figure in the international arena, especially an important actor in regional conflicts. This transition to active pragmatism has become even more palpable after the Arab Spring (Temiz, 2017). Following this new approach, projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Silk Road paved the way for China to become one of the main investors in the Middle East and Central Asia. Its ever-growing economy is also the outcome of this new approach to foreign policy. In this context, China's investments in infrastructure and oil exploration in the region have made political and economic stability a priority for China. During the 2000s, China's presence in the Middle East ceased to be only economic and energy-centered. In this sense, especially issues such as Iraq and Syria crisis require an effective cooperation mechanism for China as a permanent member of the UNSC and for Turkey as a country that is directly affected by these conflicts. Despite this need, there is neither a common definition of terrorism nor a common strategy in combating terrorism between the two countries (Temiz, 2017).
If we are to examine this lack of cooperation in terms of the Arab Spring first, we see that for China the results of the uprisings in the region pose a potential domestic threat that shapes China’s further policies in the region. The Arab Spring started with the protest of a Tunisian tradesman, Muhammed Bouazizi, towards the end of 2010. Bouazizi was overwhelmed by the economic and social restrictions, and he started the protests that spread from Tunisia to the whole Arab geography and became the symbol of change.
The anti-government protests of the Arab Spring were not only a factor that could endanger China's presence in the region, but also a potential aspiration for the Chinese people. Therefore, for the first time in its modern history, the Chinese navy carried out a rescue operation off its coast. At this stage, the media devoted itself to promoting the government's military achievements in the rescue operation of Chinese workers while diverting the attention of the public from the main issue, the popular uprising (Grgić, 2013). Although at first China has implemented a ‘wait and see’ policy parallel to its traditional non-interference approach following the protests, later Beijing decided to leave this conservative shell and cooperate with the West. For this reason, following the Arab Spring, China supported the UNSC Resolution 1970 that defines the civil war in Libya as a systemic violation of human rights and stated that the situation should be taken to the International Criminal Court. This cooperation with the West continued until China abstained from voting on the draft of Resolution 1973, which approved the creation of a no-fly zone in Libya and demanded a ceasefire and therefore, blocked humanitarian intervention in Libya. Despite that, NATO carried out military intervention in the region, causing great destruction and the military intervention in question resulted in Muammar Gaddafi’s death. Later NATO was accused by China and Russia of ignoring the Security Council resolution and making the situation worse. In addition to the news about the victims of NATO bombings in the international media, the Communist Party mouthpiece (Wu, 1994) stated that Libya was not the first target attacked by the West under the name of "humanitarianism".
It is possible to say that, after the Libya crisis China started to be more cautious about the decisions taken in the UN Security Council. That is to say, it has been proven in the example of Libya that humanitarian intervention to protect civilians is, in fact, a controversial issue and has political aims in general. As a result, the military intervention of the West became a threat to China's interests in the Middle East, and China reverted to its traditional attitude (Grgić, 2013).
As a result of these conflicts, instability in the region led to the emergence of terrorist groups. China offered support to Iraq to confront ISIS because of its economic interests and the uprisings in the Xinjiang region, as such groups were getting stronger and starting to threaten not only the countries where they emerged but also other countries with Muslim populations. Economically, the fundamental concern for China is that it is one of the main investors in the Iraqi Petroleum Industry and any threat in the region also means a threat to China's investments.
However, a rather more important issue for China was the Uyghur uprisings in the Xinjiang region. The Uighurs living there are marginalized in both social and economic spheres as a minority and are assimilated into the Chinese population with internal migration policies. But it is possible to observe that there are also externalities to these policies. It is an indisputable fact that the resistance of people overwhelmed by government repression also revealed itself as religious extremism. The spread of these ideologies in the region by those who joined extremist groups and were caught in Afghanistan and Pakistan is one of the issues that have been one of the main concerns of China since the Arab Spring. This issue will be more elaborated on within the scope of the domestic vulnerabilities that both China and Turkey use against each other.
Following the Arab Spring, the Syrian crisis also exacerbated disagreements between Turkey and China. China along with Russia vetoed the decisions of the United Nations Security Council for the solution of the Syrian crisis and stood against any intervention in Syria. Because these decisions were seen as humanitarian intervention, essentially aimed at regime change. It should also be emphasized that China has also proposed a Peace Plan to resolve conflicts in Syria. This plan proposed a ceasefire and a political transition without the use of violence. However, since this plan does not specify the role and status of Bashar Al- Assad, it has been criticized for being ambiguous and weak.
Turkey supported the decision of the UNSC. Therefore, the crisis further deepened between China and Turkey while Turkey's stance on this issue has led to the acceptance of Turkey's democratic identity by some of the skeptics of its European Union membership (Aktürk, 2017). Later this policy brought about three million Syrian refugees to Turkey.
Considering these, China aims to protect the status quo in the region to ensure the security of its investments and to prevent the reflection of the mentioned popular uprisings in its Xinjiang region, whereas Turkey is acting in line with the principles of its foreign policy. During the Syrian crisis, Beijing reverted to a more status quo approach in its foreign policy, although it aimed to cooperate with its Western partners, as it did during the Libyan crisis. These conditions drove already weak Sino-Turkish strategic relations into a crisis (Temiz, 2017).
China, Turkey, and Russia: Balance of power in Eurasia?
During the early 2000s, bilateral relations showed improvement in terms of both economic and reciprocal official visits. However, in November 2015 a Russian aircraft was sent to Syria. It was said to be violating Turkey's airspace and was shot down by Turkey. In December 2015, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei, referring to the UN Security Council’s decision about the precautions against terrorism, assessed Turkey’s attitude as a violation of that decision.
The "New Silk Road" and "One Belt, One Road Initiative" developed by China to adapt to the new dynamics created by the global financial crisis of 2008 are reflections of its policies towards Eurasia. These projects can also be considered as a continuation of China's "open door” policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in December 1978. One of the goals of this policy was to become an "upper-income society" until the year 2020. In this context, Turkey is both a gateway to Europe and the Balkans and also an important partner for establishing economic relations in Central Asia to achieve these goals. Turkey's geopolitical position in this sense is both a reason for cooperation and conflict because of the different policy approaches adopted by the two. In the case of “Belt and Road Initiative”, the project is perceived as the revival of the ancient Silk Road for Turkey which would strengthen its relations with both Central Asian countries and China, whereas, for China, the project aims to open up to West and regulate its relations with the countries on the route.
However, as a NATO ally, Turkey’s developing relations with China create concerns for the West, particularly for the US. On top of it, the Uyghur “problem” creates concerns for these projects as well. As mentioned on the impact of the Arab Spring on China, ISIS is a considerable threat to China. That is why it is trying to restrict religious extremism in the autonomous region of Xinjiang. What worries China most is the members of terrorist groups who would try to spread these ideologies when they return to the Xinjiang region and organize riots and uprisings in China. A group of Uyghurs, who came together in July 2008 to protest the government's repressive policies, got out of control and targeted Chinese civilians. On the first day of the riots, many Chinese residences, businesses, and vehicles were set on fire, and people were beaten to death or seriously injured. On the other hand, the Chinese also gathered and started the “hunt for Uyghurs”. It was also stated that the police were relatively more violent towards the Uyghurs. Moreover, Pan-Turkism which was introduced in the Xinjiang region mostly using the field of education by the Ottoman Empire, later become politicized and inspired the separatist tendencies to thrive (Jinghong, 2021). Yet in the past China was known for promoting Muslim minorities, the Hui especially, for the sake of their relations with the Middle Eastern region, however the same has not applied to the Uyghurs, as they do not define themselves as “Chinese” neither in political nor in ethnic terms. The Hui, on the other hand, are assimilated and call themselves “Chinese” (Shichor, 2009).
Additional to this, China not perceiving PKK as a terrorist organization also diminishes the possibility of cooperation in the face of a growing trade deficit between the two (World Uyghur Congress, 2010). On the contrary, though it was not officially supported, PKK has not been accepted as a terrorist organization by China (Çolakoğlu, 2018). It was also noted that Turkey will face a threat if Ankara insists on its buffer zone plans (Lin, 2015) because Turkey’s support for Uyghurs is seen as a challenge to China’s “core interest” as defined by the Defense Minister Liang Guanglie, that is to say, its sovereignty (Lin, 2015).
During the eighteenth Chinese Communist Party National Congress held in November 2012, it was agreed that neighboring countries generally rely on China in terms of economy and the USA on security concerns, and it was decided to create a new environmental strategy based on both economics and politics. At the same time, participating in the mentioned project can negatively affect relations with the USA and Russia. Within this framework, the US did not participate in the establishment of the Asian Investment Bank, which is one of the institutions that will provide financing for the project, and asked European countries not to participate, whereas Russia is concerned about the increase of China's influence in Central Asia.
Within this framework, China makes it clear that it does not favor Turkish presence in this particular region, the main reason being the historical and cultural ties of Turkey and the Central Asian countries, even though Turkey can be considered as one of the central locations for the Belt and Road project. On a different note, the main aim of the SCO might seem like a means of breaking the US hegemony in the region, assigning the security and political matters to Beijing, and creating a common foreign policy to Moscow, both are trying to prevent the other from gaining more power (Standish, 2019). Therefore, although the Declaration on the Establishment states that the Organization is not an alliance and that it is open to everyone (Article 7), Turkey’s SCO membership has never been a priority for China, as it would create another “battlefield”.
China’s debt-trap diplomacy
One can refer to the “Belt-Road Initiative” as a part of China's globalization strategy. However, the countries in the region have reservations about cooperation with China. For example, while some countries in the region are concerned that cooperation with it will not bring much financial benefit to them, there are also concerns about the possibility of China expanding its sphere of influence with this project in partner countries.
These concerns indicate that BRI is generally perceived as a geopolitical strategy that challenges the US dominance and aims to establish a Sino-centric order (Bhattacharya, 2016). Within this context, it has been widely suggested that one of the methods that are used by China is the “debt-trap diplomacy”, where China persuades developing countries to receive loans from China for their infrastructure projects, and later when the recipient country experiences financial difficulties, China seizes the asset it funded earlier. However, to make a logical judgment, one should first analyze the process of the loan distribution and the nature of the BRI projects, and the very apparent obstacles that it faces (Jones & Hameiri, 2020).
For instance, then US Vice President Mike Pence in 2018 criticized China for using this method in Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. First and foremost, the Hambantota Port’s funding by China was not proposed by China. The idea of building the Port originates in the 1970s and was proposed by a local parliamentarian D.A. Rajapaksa, later in 2007 his son Mahinda Rajapaksa started searching for international investors after postponing the project twice in 2001 and 2004. When Sri Lanka requested funding, mainly approaching India, China was the first to confirm the request for funding. Another important point to mention is that the Port initiative does not mark the start of Sri Lanka’s debt crisis. Rajapaksa’s term in office as the Prime Minister, overall, demonstrates how mismanagement and corruption lead to economic losses. Therefore, given the fact that the interest rate of the Chinese loans is far lower than other foreign loans (2.5% on average) (Weerakoon and Jayasuriya, 2019), and comprises only 9% of the Sri Lanka Government debt by 2016 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2016) it is not logical to claim that China pulled Sri Lanka into the so-called “debt trap”. Therefore, when combined with the fact that BRI is not a geopolitical strategy to ensure China’s global dominance, the claim that China provides unsustainable loans to the developing countries and when these countries experience financial difficulties, China seizes the infrastructure investments is, in fact, nothing more than a groundless claim (Jones & Hameiri, 2020).
Malaysia, as the debt trap diplomacy’s most cited example, also illustrates that the cooperation was initiated by the Malaysian side, many of these projects are not strategic and also predate the BRI (Jones & Hameiri, 2020). Furthermore, Malaysia never experienced a debt crisis so China would seize any strategic infrastructure. As it was in the case of Sri Lanka, the main driver in the Malaysian case is the corrupt ruling elites. For instance, Prime Minister Mahathir, contrary to the rhetoric adopted by the PH government, criticized Najib then-Prime Minister of Malaysia for the unsustainable and controversial projects (Jones & Hameiri, 2020). The megaprojects, on the other hand, were not suspended, indeed showing the importance of the BRI projects for the country.
Within the lines of the debt trap and the BRI projects, it has been widely debated that this pattern will also be relevant in the Turkish case. China started providing infrastructure investment loans to Turkey, for instance, Ankara-Istanbul high-speed railway is among these infrastructure projects (Öniş & Yalikun, 2021). Therefore, some might suggest that Turkey’s recent partnership with China over Western countries is also a reflection of its choice between authoritarianism and democracy respectively (Öniş & Yalikun, 2021). However, it should be noted that China’s assistance is not enough to be the alternative for Western investment (Öniş & Yalikun, 2021). Indeed, Turkey as an emerging regional power, should not adopt a stance where it chooses one over the other, on the contrary, relations with the West and China should be complementary perspectives to Turkish foreign policy.
In conclusion, the key point here is that the BRI itself is not a “well-crafted” project (Jones & Hameiri, 2020), let alone a geopolitical strategy. Economically, it is not coordinated well either. Indeed, it was noted that in 2015 only Renminbi (RMB) 1 economic growth was generated per RMB 5. Therefore, as BRI is mainly driven by economic gains, which it sometimes fails, and because the debt problems of the recipient countries arose as a result of borrowings by corrupt local elites rather than China’s infrastructure projects, it can be said that claims of China implementing a “debt-trap diplomacy” is groundless. Rather it would be more accurate to say that it is an “economic ability” used wisely as a “foreign policy instrument” (Vural & Aydın, 2019).
For this reason, it is both wrong and imaginary to evaluate the economic activities between Turkey and China in this context and to think that China will take Turkey into the debt trap and seize important places as it does in other countries.
Results and discussion
China retains the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council; it is one of the five states that have veto power over the decisions of the Council. In other words, China is among the decision-making states in the current international order. Economically, it is the second-largest economy in the world and the largest economy in Asia and China's investment in energy resources is proof that it is a permanent actor in the Middle East too (Grgić, 2013). Therefore, bilateral relations with China are becoming increasingly important for Turkey as a regional power. However, Turkey's foreign policy principle of 'turning its face to the West' and China’s economic interests in Central Asia and using the region as a buffer zone against terrorism, as well as the securitization process in Xinjiang led to the weakening of bilateral relations following the Arab Spring and Syrian crisis.
With regards to the Uyghur problem, China emphasizes the “Kurdish problem” in Turkey and perceives Turkey’s concern about Uyghurs as having double standards. Because China sees Uyghurs as an 'existential threat' to the Chinese government (Read & Walters, 2019). In this context, Ankara's relations with Beijing should not be an alternative to Turkey's relations with the West, it needs to be evaluated as a complementary perspective to it. At the same time, NATO membership and policies that prioritize relations with the West should not be an obstacle to the development of bilateral relations. Many NATO member countries have partnerships with China in high-tech investment areas, especially in the nuclear industry. For instance, since December 2020, talks on strengthening trade relations and investments between the European Union and China came back to the agenda. While the purpose of these meetings was to facilitate access to the Chinese market for European companies, Chinese president Xi Jinping stated during the online negotiations that this agreement demonstrates China’s determination on an open-door policy and would strengthen mutual trust between the parties (Liu & Brooks, 2018; Graaf et al., 2020). On the other hand, the rhetoric adopted by Turkey and especially by president Erdogan in recent years does not go further than public statements towards China’s policies about the Uyghurs. Moreover, the constant devaluation of the Turkish lira and worsening relationships with the Western partners left Turkey no choice but to ask for financial help from China. With the cash flowing in, Turkey now seems to be “tolerating” the oppression Uyghurs are still experiencing.
Therefore, instead of focusing on the ideological differences that characterize the first decade of bilateral relations, and continuously supporting Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist ideologies without being able to act on them, developing approaches based on sustainable economic cooperation would be more beneficial for further development of Sino-Turkish relations. China, in this sense, should be perceived as a powerful partner by Turkey, not as a ‘red threat’.
